During his two-day visit, he met with President Nursultan Nazarbayev, Prime Minister Serik Akhmetov and the Chairman of the Lower Chamber of Parliament (Majilis), Nurlan Nigmatulin, later delivering a lecture to students and teaching staff at the Eurasian National University.

Speaking after his meeting with President Nazarbayev, Mr Barroso said “I am most pleased to be able to confirm here today that our trade negotiators have found agreement on the substantive elements of the bilateral terms of Kazakhstan’s WTO accession, and we look forward to signing the deal soon. … Our relations go well beyond the economic dimension and also beyond simply
bilateral issues. We very much appreciate Kazakhstan’s role in promoting regional cooperation in Central Asia. Only by working together will be possible to address the common challenges that all the countries in the region face, from terrorism and extremism, to drug trafficking or water management”.

Commenting on the visit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Zhanbolat Ussenov said: “Mr Barroso’s talks in Astana have contributed to strengthening Kazakhstan’s relations with the EU. The two sides are making good progress on negotiating a new enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that will cover a broad range of issues that are in the interests of both
Kazakhstan and the EU, from trade links to counter-terrorism and managing new security threats”.

French poet Victor Hugo once stated that “amnesty is as good for those who give it as for those who receive it. It has the admirable quality of bestowing mercy on both sides”. However, as much as we have witnessed steps taken by Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan toward embracing this ideology and attempting to understand our would-be adversaries, Boko Haram, we must truly incentivize and steward talks as best we can—and perhaps on their terms—in order to bring about lasting peace and reconciliation.

Nigerians are facing many challenges, perpetual stumbling blocks hindering a smooth transition to prosperity and geopolitical competition. Yet there is none so blaringly obvious as the complacency our national leadership has emanated while our citizens routinely put their lives in jeopardy simply walking to school, attending church, or going to work. The threat of ‘domestic terrorism’ looms large and weighs heavy on our consciousness; in fact, Nobel-prize winner Wole Soyinka remarked no more than a week ago that Nigeria is on the verge of a ‘potential civil war’.

At present, we have nowhere collectively to hide or turn to but government, looking to accountable leadership to provide a lasting solution. But there are questions lingering in the air, on strategic execution rather than simple theorization.

One must of course commend the Federal institutions for standing steadfast in a commitment to restore peace and attempting to quell international criticism while nations encourage their citizens and with them their businesses to ‘escape’ from Nigeria. We must continue to applaud the Muslim Rights Concern (MURIC) for suggesting that offering a reprieve to members of Boko Haram remains an important option, put forward solely in order to right the insurgency in the North, a plague systematically destroying the region’s socio-economic fabric.

However, as I have remarked over the course of the last weeks and indeed months across the globe, we must be willing to dialogue directly one-to-one and moreover seek alternative solutions under an umbrella of amnesty should the broad theoretical suggestion not take flight in practice (as the notion has thus far been unilaterally rejected by Boko Haram spokesmen).

We must make a concerted effort in order to return our national reputation to its lost glory, as a bright light emanating throughout West Africa, beaconing international integration.

As I and separately MURIC representatives have mentioned in-past, one viable alternative suggests that a dedicated civilian-based initiative be implemented. This would supplement or perhaps even replace military exercises in contemporary Boko Haram engagement. Much like the hiring of outside counsel in a civil matter, negotiations would and should be held from spokesman to spokesman, in a manner that befits all parties involved. This is an advocacy role I have aimed to secure for the last year.

Indeed our officers are no safer than our families in dealing with those we do not fully understand, as we learn of twelve souls now missing after an attack by the armed Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), perhaps in-part due to such a call for amnesty being promoted while concurrently exercising combative operations.

Nigeria must also refresh her own appreciation of the ramifications of un-checked intimidation. Continued violence not only plagues the lives of citizens in-country but promotes instability and a lack of infrastructural confidence to communities in the Diaspora and colleagues on the global stage. Infighting, as this truly is, perpetually erodes Nigeria’s aspirations of joining the echelon of the BRICS and pigeonholes us in a vicious cycle of violence begetting poverty and poverty begetting violence once more.

We must work closely with our global colleagues as this is not simply ‘our problem’ anymore. Nigeria has long served as a symbol of African economic power and potential; with the help of our trusted investors and trade partners, we continue to have in front of us an opportunity to sustainably develop our nation above and beyond the wildest dreams of our children.

Ultimately, we must settle our differences in the interest of unified, national healing and mutual prosperity, whether coming to such a binding resolution is the drive of a government committee, executive leadership, or achieved from a single actor speaking on behalf of his people. And though the threat to our fiscal trajectory remains a sincere concern, the human toll has penetrated our bureaucracy and elevated the urgency in ending our veritable self-implosion.

Though it is in our hands to create tangible change, we as a nation must be willing to break the barriers of old and seek innovative answers to solving the challenges of our new Nigerian century.

The following was originally published in Foreign Policy Magazine, penned by Hayley Barbour and Ed Rogers:

Last week, we learned that the Chinese government had hacked into the computers of some of Washington’s most prominent organizations — law firms, think tanks, news outlets, human rights groups, congressional offices, embassies, and federal agencies — not to steal intellectual property or unearth state secrets, but rather to find out how things get done in the nation’s capital. According to the Washington Post, hackers were “searching for the unseen forces that might explain how the administration approaches an issue … with many Chinese officials presuming that reports by think tanks or news organizations are secretly the work of government officials — much as they would be in Beijing.” In other words, it appears that Chinese hackers have a lot of time on their hands and don’t know much about Washington. There are probably instances where a massive database and a fancy algorithm can tell you what you need to know about a place, but D.C. isn’t one of them.

“They’re trying to make connections between prominent people who work at think tanks, prominent donors that they’ve heard of and how the government makes decisions,” the Post reported one informed expert as saying. “It’s a sophisticated intelligence-gathering effort at trying to make human-network linkages of people in power, whether they be in Congress or the executive branch.” Well, it’s possible to use espionage to learn the inside thinking at one of Washington’s prestigious think tanks. Or you could just attend any of the dozens of daily seminars, issue briefings, and the like in town, raise your hand, and get a direct answer to almost any question. You might even get a free bagel and a cup of coffee.

In Washington, you don’t need a satellite to find out who is raising money for whom. Just look at the co-host list of an invitation to any fundraiser. And if the Chinese really want to get a look at where the power decisions get made, send an undercover eater to see who’s dining with whom at the Four Seasons for breakfast, Tosca for lunch, and the Palm or Oceanaire for dinner. And here’s a secret in Washington the Chinese haven’t hacked into yet: Actual decision-makers will meet with the actual experts and affected parties in order to make as informed a decision as possible. Shhhh. Don’t tell the Chinese.

Right now, it’s a good bet that the Chinese hackers are sifting through millions of emails in which tons of people are saying sensible things, making all sorts of predictions, and maybe even revealing what they think about how and why a particular decision was made. But often the talk isn’t connected to any particular decision — and it isn’t always well-informed. Washington is a cacophonic symphony of gigantic plans, dueling facts, eager ideals, and petty pursuits. To understand it, you have to be able to hear it all at the same time and also understand that the music never stops. Beijing will blow a circuit board trying to make sense of all this.

Maybe the Chinese don’t understand that a literal transcript of what is said in Washington does not tell the real story. It never has. It never will. People are always saying something here. All we do is talk. At any given time you can find someone saying anything you want to hear — on any given side of any issue — from missile defense to agricultural policy. That doesn’t happen in Beijing. And that’s part of the reason it’s so easy to be busy and yet so hard to be productive in D.C. It takes time to know who is relevant to a decision, to understand that person’s history and how he or she approaches an issue. That’s extremely important and not always easy to figure out.

Our decades of experience tell us that it’s the nuance and fragments of information that form the mosaic of Washington politics and power. Reading what a single perceptive reporter overhears when strolling through the Speaker’s Lobby during the last vote in the House of Representatives on a Thursday afternoon can be every bit as useful as what a hundred reporters write after a briefing by Jay Carney at the White House. Often it’s better to have a short sidebar conversation during a chance encounter at a dinner or cocktails with a 20- or 30-something staffer on a key congressional committee than a courtesy meeting with a member of Congress or a cabinet secretary.

Finding the right people is important. But more and more, Washington has become a place that rewards what you know rather than whom you know. Sure, friendships and political affiliations make introductions easier and some meetings friendlier, but really hearing what was said and accomplishing something afterward requires real work and a lot of relevant, persuasively presented information. And though Washington always gets a bad rap, the people who make decisions that matter really do take their independence, transparency, and integrity seriously. While inside deals and doing favors are the commonplace caricature, they don’t represent how Washington really works today.

The Chinese apparently spent gigantic amounts of resources plumbing the depths of computer systems inside the Beltway. Maybe that’s because the mindset in Beijing is much more about top-down governance. But a lot of what moves the federal government originates in state capitals, places like Sacramento and Raleigh. The discerning Washington insider listens closely to what’s said outside the Beltway to find out what’s likely to happen next in D.C.

The Chinese government’s worst mistake was to imagine that it could find out anything worth knowing by reading things that were written down, electronically or otherwise. If anyone were writing down anything useful in the first place, WikiLeaks stopped all that. The fact is, you don’t have to spy — you can just ask. You don’t need to peep through the keyhole to follow the political maneuvering in Washington; just walk in to any good steakhouse and look around.

The list is our attempt to respond to what we see as a relatively underdeveloped marketplace of ideas when it comes to scenario planning for expropriation, unfair regulatory intervention, nationalizations, and resource nationalism events that have an impact on foreign investors in emerging markets.  The literature is abundant on the existence of political risks, but very few research houses are advancing many solutions or strategies.

There seems to be little dispute that resource nationalism is back in a big way, and it is not just limited to the developing world.  Resource nationalism is front and center, from Europe to North America.  Not all businesses are properly prepared to operate in a world in which states and parastatals are the major players in the market, while there are often dangerously naive assumptions about the protections of law in unlawful contexts.  There are many urgent questions to be addressed on a case-by-case basis, such as the connection between resource nationalism risk and the effective implementation of corporate social responsibility programmes as well as the implementation of a corporate foreign policy.

The good news is that there is a stronger than ever international legal framework for investors, particularly through Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and through options for direct investor-state arbitration under ICSID, NAFTA, the Energy Charter Treaty and many other regional trade pacts as well as dozens of other avenues explored in the checklist.  As a practice area that Amsterdam & Partners LLP is well known for, I would be pleased to hear from any readers to discuss these issues in more detail.

Resource Nationalism Checklist – Jan 13 by Robert Amsterdam

Sticky Stagnation 2012

The system is not ready for development

Year 2012 is becoming economic history. After a month or two, the experts will carefully explain everything after looking into the final statistical data. In the meantime, there are several symbolic stories that seem to create an image.

The first scene: Pensions (retirement plans)

Perhaps one of the most discussed topics was the future of the pension system and savings trust. As a result, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, who has blamed the calculation error on his predecessors, returned most of the money to the pension distribution feeder.

Liberal economists spoke out against it. Pension Reform 2002 indeed had a radical error in the calculations: the calculation was focused on the development of a market economy and nation-building dependent on its citizens, and not vice versa. Today, when resources of the savings system are mainly controlled by the state management company, Vnesheconombank (VEB), and are mostly invested in government debt securities – the system became fiction. In the present circumstances, cancellation of the independent compulsory pension component and transfer of the payments to the workers social security pension fund distribution seem more logical.

The second scene: Property

Another remarkable event is the acquisition of TNK-BP by Rosneft, which was blessed by Vladimir Putin as “a nice big deal, which is important not only for the Russian energy sector, but also for the whole economy.”

First, the deal puts an end not only to the extremely fashionable official rattle about the “invariant” focus on privatization, but also to the use of privatization ideology in Russia in general (both, fiscal and political). The potential cost of this de-privatization operation (the government is regaining the ownership of once sold property and now owned by the private owners) is more than twice the revenue earned from the privatization during our recent history.

Second, there are serious doubts about the availability of private capital willing to finance such high volume Russian nationalization (Rosneft had a similar experience before when it captured the main production unit of Yukos, and had to borrow money from the Chinese comrades on less transparent terms). I would like to be wrong, but there is every reason to believe that the Bank of Russia would eventually become the leading source of funds for the formation of “the world’s largest mining and liquid hydrocarbons reserve company.

The third scene: Growth

Every economist knows that the country’s GDP consists of consumption, investment and net exports (excess of exports over imports).

Consumption has been growing slowly despite the disturbing Central Banks’s rapid expansion of individual loans. Capital is in its fifth consecutive year of the massive flight from the country.  Investment barely reached the pre-crisis mark only by means of the mysterious additions by Rosstat, as well as questionable mega-projects induced by the government. Exports, mainly raw hydrocarbons, seem to hit the ceiling both in its physical and value terms. Due to the failure of the national energy policy, global economic risks and the shale revolution, a fall in exports, perhaps sharp, is not far off. In contrast, imports after Russia’s WTO accession, despite all the tricks played by Russia’s vigilant main doctor who had suddenly awakened to care about the environment, is bound to rise.

In other words, it is unclear how economic growth will begin in general, not even speaking about the target of 5-6%.

Afterword.

It seems that Putin, having returned to the Kremlin, has begun to realize that he has entered uncharted waters: he has become much weaker, and Russia, on the contrary, has changed a lot in recent months, and one cannot simply “rule” it as it used to be ruled. There is a sharp conflict between the dynamic development of the country on a par with world leaders and total impracticality of the system constructed by Putin. Exactly the same problem in the past inspired Gorbachev to announce the two logically contradictory slogans – perestroika and acceleration. Both signs are present in Putin’s speeches, but there is no serious determination to initiate changes: the Russian elite is well aware that perestroika would cause unpredictable consequences for the elite.

Unfortunately, there is only one alternative to the catharsis of perestroika, and that is a viscous stagnation, eventually turning into a full-scale catastrophe.

This article originally published in Insurance Day on 11 December 2012.

The thing about measuring political risk is it is never the same tomorrow as it was today.

It seems every day there is news of major social or political upheaval that has an existential impact on both foreign investors and their insurers. From threats of a coup in Thailand to rebel invasions in the Congo to an anti-corruption trial in Brazil, every business with foreign operations finds itself tasked not only with navigating complex political issues but also coming up with its own policies to limit exposure and rapidly respond to changing conditions.

While political risk has always been a factor for investors and their insurers, in more recent years a confluence of events has led to a heightened sense of exposure. Accounting firm Ernst & Young has titled “resource nationalism” as the biggest risk facing mining companies for the second year in a row, while Eurasia Group warned investors the tenuous balance of domestic economic stability against international security would be a theme for 2012.

Slower growth in established markets combined with saturation in the Bric countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) have pushed investors out to less familiar frontier markets such as Nigeria, Indonesia, and Kazakhstan, which, for example, feature unique legal challenges and risks.

In my experience working in countries featuring deficient rule of law, there were always a number of common steps and approaches that we would recommend to clients to offer the best protection possible.

Firstly, it is important to have high-quality intelligence on your risk profile. Traditional approaches to measuring political risk have focused on assigned quantitative values to both dynamic and structural risks, from regime stability to monetary policy and exchange controls. But when assessing country and project-specific risk, these traditional models need to be supported by an expanded understanding of geopolitical trends in the region and the motivations of every company stakeholder.

A few years ago, some groups began to implement something they called an “inverted risk calculus” which examines the quality of a political relationship with the local government and state-owned firms. This kind of assessment is just as important as the financial details of a potential deal.

Because of the flexible and discretionary approach to property rights and contract law in many emerging markets and the ever-weakening rule of law, the risk manager is not likely to have an accurate degree of certainty of what the risk actually is or what the driving factors are.

In these cases, the pricing or valuation of an opportunity is no longer dispositive, and insurers are already adapting to this enlarged role of geopolitical risk, which goes far beyond simple elections to include a measurement of active cooperation in helping the government and national champions secure their objectives.

After rebalancing a risk profile with a heavier emphasis on politics, it is in the interest of the insurer that the insureds come to an agreement over what types of state intervention may be possible and why.

For example, in a number of countries from Venezuela to South Africa to Indonesia, we have observed policies of resource nationalism that respond to ideological imperatives. In Canada and Australia similar problems arise out of suddenly aggressive tax regimes based on financial imperatives. And lastly, in challenging markets such as Central Asia as well as China, you have risks of state intervention guided by arcane clan politics and internal power dynamics.

The point is, along with each set of driving factors, certain strategies should be pursued in order to successfully build a structure of incentives among the different parties to predictably settle disputes and continue operations.

There are a number of pre-emptive legal and advocacy actions that can be adopted to mitigate risk:

• For example, all investors should undertake a comprehensive review of potential exposure not simply before abuses of regulatory, tax, and criminal law, but also administrative law; and

• For example, on numerous occasions in Russia, oil executives from a well known multinational corporation were jailed and interrogated over alleged “visa issues.”

One of the most important gold mines in Kyrgyzstan is in danger of seizure based on technicalities of its operating license. Meanwhile, in relatively advanced economies like South Africa, decisions in the land reform process often come down to the paperwork.

For the insureds facing a hostile host government or a determined competitor, the motivation is often very separate from the tactic used to damage the asset. There may not be any environmental disaster, human rights issues, or regulatory compliance problems – sometimes the most upright corporate citizens become the first targets through unexpected applications of administrative law.

Another area that deserves careful examination is the expansion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes. CSR has become a commonplace pre-emptive tactic to minimize political risk by seeking to align interests of the community and political stakeholders, and demonstrate the “win-win” aspect of a mutually beneficial relationship between the company and the people of the country.

If anything, CSR needs to co-joined with a broader corporate foreign policy (CFP). Whereas CSR often becomes trapped behind a wall of optimistic rhetoric and little actual results, a CFP can be designed to build a network of local multilateral relationships and incentive structures that goes beyond the limited target of government relations.

In countries such as Venezuela, Nigeria, and Indonesia, we have observed some companies who continue to thrive despite significant political risk because of a well-designed CFP that balances interests of key officials in the administration alongside more permanent community leaders. Many other investors, unfortunately, have not been so lucky.

The issue of designing pre-emptive, independent political strategies on behalf of companies relates closely to the issues of human rights present in each of these countries.

Any insured that has employees in its foreign operations is exposed to a certain level of human rights, but what many investors do not realise is there is also a benefit. Due to the growing body of international law surrounding the protection of human rights, there are many mechanisms available to protect the rights of the company against unlawful violations.

In some countries, where arbitration is seen as an ineffective resolution, the invocation of protections under international human rights treaties to protect employees and investment is sometimes the last line of defence.

In conclusion, insureds will find themselves in the strongest possible position – potentially allowing for the consideration of premium discounts – if they consider the following factors when investing in unstable political economies:

• The preparation of a dynamic, rebalanced risk portfolio;

• An examination of all scenarios for possible state intervention;

• The deployment of strong CSR and CFR programmes; and

• The organisation of the full tool box of legal responses from arbitration to local criminal law to international treaties.

An intriguing analysis has recently been published in the Moscow Times by Associate Fellow of the Russia & Eurasia Programme at Chatham House in London John Lough.

Below, John writes at length about the transformation of Rosneft in to a power-player at British Petroleum and the TNK-BP acquisition’s immediate ramifications to the Russian economy and to the global energy sphere:

…A critical factor that allowed the deal to go ahead this time was Gazprom’s demise as a national champion. Its sustained underperformance and lack of responsiveness to the rapidly changing global gas situation brought about by the shale gas revolution are confirmation of a trend that has built up over many years. Gazprom does not currently have the ability to reform itself and adapt to a more competitive environment. Its business model in Europe is coming under increasing strain, and it has so far been unable to diversify to Asian markets.

It is likely that Putin concluded that Gazprom, which until 2008 was a symbol of Russian power and prestige, has become more of a liability. The Kremlin needed to change horses.

A further strong selling point for the deal was the opportunity not just to create a new national champion but to grow it rapidly. This is where BP was needed. BP was hugely successful in creating value at TNK-BP thanks to its disciplined approach to portfolio management and its application of world-class technology and skills. Rosneft has a patchwork of production companies that require integration in a way that was achieved after the merger of BP’s and TNK’s disparate assets in 2003. Rosneft head Igor Sechin clearly took notice that the value of TNK-BP quadrupled in nine years.

It is not clear at this stage how Rosneft will seek to use BP’s expertise, but this will be key to creating long-term value for the company. While critics see the dangers of Rosneft underperforming like Gazprom if it also becomes too large and state-dominated, the decision to give a foreign company a 20 percent stake in a national oil company is unprecedented. Notably, Putin went out of his way to praise BP’s performance in Russia when he met Sechin after this week’s deal was announced.

Putin said that Rosneft’s acquisition was “needed not only for the Russian energy sector but for the entire economy.” Although Putin did not give details, it is fair to assume that he was referring to the prospect of Rosneft, with BP’s know-how, setting new standards that can be a benchmark for other Russian companies. After all, Putin is well-aware that TNK-BP has outperformed other Russian companies, including Rosneft, by a substantial margin.

Questions remain about the impact of Rosneft’s acquisition of TNK-BP on the government’s proposed privatization agenda, which includes Rosneft. Some believe that the deal marks the resurrection of state capitalism and a serious blow to the government’s former commitment to put more state assets into private hands. At this stage, it is too early to say since privatization efforts have been held up by adverse market conditions. Still, the Kremlin appears committed to privatization as a way of addressing the economy’s lack of competitiveness. Rosneft looks like the exception to that rule since BP will become a substantial minority shareholder, and this should help improve Rosneft’s operating standards.

Creating a new national super-champion could even put the issue of Gazprom’s privatization on the table. The subject was previously taboo because of Gazprom’s status as an untouchable national symbol. But now, Rosneft will be the standard bearer of Russia’s global energy influence. Referring to the possibility of privatization, Putin said in February that the government would “at some point go over to this so that Gazprom works in a different way.” His frustration has clearly been growing with the company’s failure to address the increasing pressures it faces in the European market from alternative sources of gas supply. At the very least, a long-overdue change of senior management at Gazprom now looks more likely.

The other interesting aspect of the Rosneft deal is how the extraordinary comeback of Sechin will affect the balance of interests among members of Putin’s inner circle, including Gunvor co-owner Gennady Timchenko and the Rotenberg brothers, who have business interests related to the Russian energy industry. Sechin is experiencing a rapid and surprising recovery after it looked like he was on the way out earlier this year. This may now need to be balanced by an allocation of access to new assets to other Kremlin power brokers. Another open question is how far Sechin’s influence will extend to other segments of the energy sector.

Finally, the deal has left Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s team looking bruised and weakened. Both Medvedev and Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich opposed the deal, but they were outmaneuvred by Sechin and overruled by Putin. This defeat could clip the wings of Russia’s leading economic liberals and strengthen those who support state capitalism.

The long-awaited TNK-BP denouement has arrived, but the drama is not over. The ultimate consequences of establishing Rosneft as the primary national champion could still be spectacular.

The following opinion editorial was penned by Rt. Hon. Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and originally published in the Wall Street Journal Europe:

Zimbabwe’s Movement for Democratic Change recently commemorated its 13th anniversary at a ceremony in the city of Bulawayo. Contrary to popular belief, my political party had much to celebrate.

Four years ago, Zimbabwe was nearly a failed state. Hyperinflation had reached a historic peak. Freedoms were stifled at every turn. Starvation ran rampant and cholera had spread to a near-epidemic level. Schools were closed, many for an entire year. The ratio of students to textbooks was 15 to 1. Political institutions were in large part—if not totally—to blame for a lack of both vision and accountability.

We can point to the past, and the international community often does so. We’ve been told that the atrocities of 2008 continue to justify economic sanctions hindering our forward trajectory.

But in the past four years, we have taught our colleagues at home and around the world that it is possible to have a Zimbabwean government that serves the people. In that time, we have grown dynamically. Bolder, lasting reforms are on the way.

We realize that Zimbabwe as a global actor is often seen as being irrevocably divided. Our political process, including the steps ahead of finalizing our national constitution, has been scrutinized for focusing on reparation rather than reconciliation.

But it is important to recognize that Zimbabwe is undergoing a sensitive process of political, economic and societal revival. We are bringing about a new culture of governance. We have curbed hyperinflation while enhancing our economic infrastructure. We are rehabilitating our education sector—the ratio of students to textbooks is now 1 to 1. We are providing food security and fortifying a skill-intensive labor market.

In a time of unprecedented mineral wealth, we are seeking to improve extraction oversight, audit the distribution channels for domestic revenue growth, and encourage social responsibility from the private and public sectors. We understand the need for technological innovation to compete in the global sphere, and know that expanding telecommunication investment will have a unifying, progressive effect on our nation.

Obviously, there are still clear and present challenges to such modernizations. Targeted smear campaigns and censorship imposed by our political opposition have created a incessant assault on our brand. Though marginal achievements have been made in the bureaucratic realm, ZANU-PF remains devoted to destructive tactics when elections loom. Working with ZANU-PF and President Robert Mugabe in cabinet has not been easy.

We recognize, however, that diversity and dissent are healthy signs of growth. Though the “Zimbabwe situation” is often used to evoke frustration, let us redefine it as an everlasting confidence in the future, a confidence inherent to our culture. We have been the breadbasket of Africa and have proven ourselves ready to participate again at the global forefront.

Five years ago, I was a battered prisoner locked away in a police cell. Today, I serve as president of the Movement for Democratic Change and prime minister of a nation on the upswing. We encourage the Zimbabwean diaspora, our partners in the Southern African Development Community, and the international community to take a closer look at Zimbabwe. They might be surprised at what they find.

The new route seeks to compete with shipments to Zimbabwe by road from neighboring South Africa that supplement supplies through an existing pipeline, which is working at full capacity, Roman Trotsenk said late last week.

Rosneft expects to obtain construction permits and conclude the necessary agreements by the end of this year, he said.

The new pipeline — from Mozambique’s port of Beira to Zimbabwe’s capital, Harare, Trotsenko said — will presumably run alongside the current 700-kilometer link.

The pipeline has been reported to potentially be extended through to Zambia, Malawi and Botswana.

The existing pipeline from Mozambique has a capacity of 130 million liters a month, which amounts to 1.3 million metric tons or 9.8 million barrels per year. Zimbabwean officials said the new line would carry up to 300 million liters a month.

Zimbabwe’s consumption of oil products is about 5 million tons per year, Trotsenko said.

The African project, Trotsenko stated, is a chance for Rosneft to win a new sales market. He didn’t elaborate.

In other news, Rosneft recently began producing oil in Venezuela as part of an international consortium.

Continued, as excerpted from Steel Guru:

A Russian delegation led by Industry and Trade Minister Denis Manturov visited Zimbabwe and Mozambique earlier this month to explore investment opportunities.

During the visit, Russia and Zimbabwe signed an agreement to protect mutual investments, which Manturov said laid the groundwork for Russian companies to become more active in the African country.

It’s never fair to extrapolate one quote or passage as being representative of a book as important as this one, but since I happened to have my laptop open as I was finishing it, I couldn’t help pulling a couple quotes. Here’s one regarding the proposition that credit may be a “human right”:

But what did Muhammad Yunus actually say about this human right? “[Credit is] also a human right, so that people can create their self-employment with that money. If they can create income for themselves, they can take care of right to food, right to shelter much more easily than government can ever do it.” If, as some have speculated, 90 percent of microfinance is directed to consumption, or loans cost 144 percent, how does this create employment or income? This is the difference between the theory and the practice of microfinance.

And here’s another a few pages later:

…the debate is not whether microfinance works, but how the inherent conflicts of interest can be managed.

I would actually consider Chapter 13 alone to be a mission statement for the entire industry.

What else is in this book…obviously a lot of uncomfortable truths, but I think the most appropriate way to continue discussing them here would be to break it down by audience types.